Expected Behavior in the Dictator Game.

This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. We performed a field experiment in Baja California among a population of unexperienced subjects. Using monetary incentives we find that only 10 percent of subjects correctly guessed the expected Nash equilibrium payoff (zero). In sharp contrast, the modal subject predicts the equal split. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% expected the equal split. Surprisingly, their actions are uncorrelated with their predictions: they choose a donation in the interior of the interval. We conjecture that the equal split is the natural solution to the problem but because the dictators are involved, they also consider the chance of keeping the complete pie for themselves. Dictators solve the puzzle by passing a positive amount of money wh ich reflects the tension between fairness and self-interest. In consequence, any giving smaller than the equal split division may not be considered altruistic behavior. Only a donation larger than the 50/50 split would reflect generosity.expectations, dictator game, equal split, guessing.

Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity

This paper investigates the effect of poverty and good intentions on dictator game giving. Previous experimental studies in which information was supplied to dictators about recipients have shown that dictator giving increases overall in this context. We develop a new design of standard informed dictator games with three main variants: 1) three recipients are used instead of one; 2) dictators are informed that their recipients are poor; 3) dictators give donations in the form of medicines instead of money. We have found that 46% of the experimental subjects (dictators) give the full amount of money (100% of the endowment) in the “poverty” treatment, while in the “medicines” treatment this percentage increases to 72%. Such extremely generous behavior has seldom been observed in the previous literature on dictator games.dictator giving, poverty effect, good intentions effect, medicines.

Promoting Helping Behavior with Framing in Dictator games.

A number of recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding the recipient or any other social context is provided. In contrast, the lack of information discourages other-regarding behavior and the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game-theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper uses framing to explore the role of helping—behavior in dictator games. The whole experiment includes both classroom and regular experiments for the baseline and the framing treatment. To promote these motivations we included a “non—neutral” sentence at the end of the instructions, which reads “Note that he relies on you”. Our baseline and framed DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentence promotes generous-regarding behavior.dictator game, framing effects, helping behavior, altruism.

Third-party Punishment is more effective on Women: Experimental Evidence

Existing experimental studies mainly focus on motivations and choices of thirdparty punishers, but only few of them detect sanction efficacy contradictory results. Our paper wants to shed light on this point. In particular, we want to detect whether the threat of being punished for unfair actions is credible and affects subjects’ choices thus, making it rational to behave fairly. To disentangle the effect of expected punishment on behaviour, we implement in the lab two experimental games - the standard Dictator Game, that is used as baseline, and the Third-Party Punishment Game that incorporates a third player who observes and may punish the Dictator. The idea is that, if the Dictator in treatment TPP believes punishment is a credible threat, s/he may decide to change her/his behaviour, that is, to behave generously in order to avoid sanctions. We find a clear gender bias: women reacted to the punishment threat by increasing their transfer to the Recipient, while men did exactly the opposite.

Self-discrimination: A field experiment on obesity.

While it is well-established in the literature that obese people are discriminated against in the working environment, little is known about their own actual behavior. Our experimental setting investigates whether these potentially discriminated people respond in a different way when faced with the opportunity of earning a positive amount of money. Significant lower money requests by people who are self-reported as obese confirm our self-discrimination hypothesis, offering an additional explanation for the wage gap; Thus, it seems that these obese people earn less not only because of discrimination against them but also because they themselves are less demanding. Interestingly, results are more robust for females, especially for those who "feel", but they are not actually, obese.Discrimination, obesity, field experiment, gender, self-perception

Moral Framing in Dictator Games by Short Sentences.

Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room design, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards. Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reciprocity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral” sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modified DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selfish behavior vanishes.dictator game, framing e ?ect, social issues, fairness, reciprocity.

Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity

This paper investigates the effect of poverty and good intentions on dictator game giving. Previous experimental studies in which information was supplied to dictators about recipients have shown that dictator giving increases overall in this context. We develop a new design of standard informed dictator games with three main variants: 1) three recipients are used instead of one; 2) dictators are informed that their recipients are poor; 3) dictators give donations in the form of medicines instead of money. We have found that 46% of the experimental subjects (dictators) give the full amount of money (100% of the endowment) in the ‘poverty’ treatment, while in the ‘medicines’ treatment this percentage increases to 72%. Such extremely generous behavior has seldom been observed in the previous literature on dictator games

Intergenerational Transmission of 'Religious Capital': Evidence from Spain

The paper examines intergenerational transmission of 'religious capital' from parents to their offspring, within an economic framework of a production function of 'religiosity' where parental inputs serve as factors of production. The database used for the empirical analysis is based on a unique, rich, large-scale survey (2488 interviews) that has been conducted in 1998 in all 47 Spanish provinces. In addition to information on the religious affiliation of the respondent and his parents It has detailed data on two dimensions of the individual's religiosity: mass attendance (a public religious activity with utilitarian/social motives-has six alternative levels); and prayer (an intimate/private religious activity with pure religious motives-11 levels).It also includes information on the mother's and father's church attendance when the respondent was a child (nine levels) as well as the respondent's mass participation at the age of 12. Socio-economic background data are also available. While most empirical studies are employing one dichotomous variable to measure religiosity (e.g. goes to church-yes/no; practicing Catholic- yes/no), our data base provides much more details on religious activities of respondents and their parents, thus facilitating a more sophisticated analysis with more robust conclusions. The inputs of the parents are proxied by the mother's and father's intensity of church attendance when the respondent was a child. The output (respondent's religiosity) is measured using detailed data on the two aspects of the individual's religiosity: mass attendance and prayer. Socio-economic background variables, that might affect religiosity, are also considered. A theoretical framework is followed by stylized facts on the household composition (in terms of religious affiliation and level of religiosity of the mother and father). Then the effect of the parents' input on respondent's religiosity is examined - first using cross-tabulation and then using regression analysis that facilitates the estimation of the various net effects and their interactions. All in all we find that parental religious inputs significantly affect individuals' religiosity. The route of intergenerational transmission is from both parents to children. However, for women the more pronounced route is the mother, while for men- transmission is flowing mainly through the father. An exception is prayer habits of men that are affected more significantly by the mother's input. We do not find substitution or complimentarity between the impacts of inputs of the mother and the father. This study contributes to our understanding of religious behaviour in Spain and is responding to the growing interest in religiosity in the European Union, as expressed by the outlines of the seventh framework research agenda.religious capital, catholic, church-attendance, prayer, intergenerational transmission, production, Spain

Gender Differences in Prisoners' Dilemma

Charles Darwin (1874) stated that "women are less selfish but men are more competitive". Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni & Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyse the role of gender in one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma. We use payments cards to reveal players' values of the game, what gives information about players' beliefs on rival's cooperativeness. Surprisingly 15% of population choose the cooperative action although the gender effect is quite ambiguous in actions. Within those players who choose the cooperative action, females do so believing her rival will defect.Prisoners' Dilemma, cooperation, payment cards, expected utility theory, beliefs, gender differences.

Why Do European Governments Favor Religion?

This paper explores a highly controversial issue: while most European countries are undergoing a clear and well-documented process of secularization, the governments of these countries widely support religious institutions. The arguments put forward by the median voter seem insufficient to explain the data. We show that if political parties are allowed to take an ideological position with respect to religion, the observed deviations from the most preferred policy by the median voter could be explained. The assumptions of our model are tested using European data. We observe that citizens are concerned about secularization, but that there are differences between religious and non-religious citizens as we assume. In addition, and in consonance with our assumptions, the percentage of religious-averse inhabitants is very small.religiosity, favoritism, voting, political economics.